

# Manipulating Mobile Devices with a private GSM Base Station – a Case Study

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**Abstract:** The ascending number of mobile devices is accompanied by an ever increasing effort of malware developers to find new means of infecting them. GSM, as a basic technology for mobile communication used by most mobile phones, lacks certain security aspects. In order to access a provider network the mobile equipment authenticates itself against the network, whereas the latter does not have to prove its authenticity. Based on this design flaw we demonstrate an approach to remotely reconfigure a mobile device in order to manipulate its system settings. This can give an attacker the opportunity to hijack data connections or even infect the mobile device with malware. Examination of the applicability of our theoretical approach in a field experiment proofed the lack of security in GSM. Reconfiguration of mobile devices during the field experiment was only successful for a few devices because of the technical limitations and user cautiousness.

## 1 Introduction

The current number of Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and High Speed Packet Access (HSPA) subscriptions is 3.976 billion [Fro09], which represents almost 90 percent of global mobile subscribers. The remaining 10 percent are comprised of Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) and other technologies. According to [Fro09] the number of subscriptions is still going to rise until 2014 due to emerging markets and the low price equipment. At the same time most mobile personal devices nowadays offer a large set of functionality way beyond speech communication and short text messages. For that reason mobile devices can rather be seen to be nodes in a mobile internet where each node potentially grants access to valuable assets. As with nodes in the wired internet this provides motivation for attackers to perform malicious actions against the subscribers, ranging from Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to identity theft. Recent development of Software Defined Radios (SDRs) enables everybody to setup their own mobile network. The expenses to buy a SDR and develop the software are minimal compared to conventional network equipment. A working example for the required software is openBTS, which was made publicly available by its developers [Kes08]. The idea behind openBTS is to pro-

vide researchers and less developed countries with an affordable GSM system. Prior to this development research has concentrated on the encryption scheme utilized in the GSM communication protocol [BSW00, BB05]. Current work includes practical attacks on the encryption scheme [HS08] and vulnerability discovery on the Mobile Station (MS) of the customer [Wel09]. Nohl and Paget [NP09] present the discoveries they experienced during tests with openBTS and MSs and, moreover, give an overview of attacks on the encryption scheme. The research of over the air (OTA) reconfiguration in [MGP09] is closely related to GSM security and this paper in particular.

One specific security flaw in GSM is the lack of mutual authentication. The MS has to authenticate against the network before being granted access. On the other hand, authentication of the network is not covered by the respective authentication algorithm A3 [3GP01]. Identification of the MS in order to access the correct subscriber information in the provider's Home Location Register (HLR) for billing and authentication happens via the secret International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI). The handset has to send this customer identification number to the Base Transceiver Station (BTS) before the actual authentication process is started. An IMSI catcher can exploit this flaw and enables law enforcement to intercept calls. This hardware device is expensive and not publicly available. Yet, with a SDR, openBTS and knowledge of the network identification code everybody is capable of intercepting GSM communication. Furthermore, an adversary can by these means gain access to secret subscriber information, for instance, the IMSI.

A provider offers a multitude of services for its customers. Keeping these service configurations for each MS up to date is not feasible via direct access through customer service. Also taking into consideration the handset's numerous configuration settings (e.g. Synchronization, Wireless) amplifies the urge for remote OTA management of MSs. This issue is addressed by the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) Device Management working group and the OTA Client Provisioning standards in particular. Client provisioning allows anybody to send configuration updates to a MS. Before a provisioning message is accepted by the handset its authenticity is validated by checking a Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) value. A network operator can use the secret subscriber information as the shared secret for the HMAC function. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, an adversary can also gain access to this secret information. Consequently, he is capable of constructing authentic configuration messages in order to abuse the client provisioning functionality, for example, to redirect internet connections or install malicious software on the MS.

In this paper we present a novel approach to attack handsets with the aim of controlling the MS's configuration. We show that the GSM standard endorses an adversary in alluring MSs into connecting to a private BTS in theory and provide evidence for its practical applicability as experienced during our experiments. Consequently, we implemented a basic proof of concept, based upon a SDR and openBTS to prove the theoretical aspects of the attack. To assess the practical effectiveness of the approach we conducted a field experiment in combination with a questionnaire to estimate the probability of a successful attack. From the perspective of an attacker our approach provides new ways of attacking mobile devices, which can be synthesized into follow-up attacks.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. An overview of related work in the

area of GSM and mobile security is presented in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the technical background for our approach. The technical description of the implementation is presented in Section 4. We provide validation of our approach via a field experiment in Section 5. Finally, we give a conclusion and describe future work in Section 6.

## 2 Related Work

The well-known flaws in the GSM standard have been addressed in [3GP99] and taken into consideration for subsequent standards. The approach of forging OTA Client Provisioning messages has already been investigated in [MGP09]. Yet, our technique differs in that it also involves a private BTS, which gives an adversary a bigger scope to attack mobile devices. Compared to the conventional OTA attack, this new approach introduces novel use cases.

Other research, which is related to our work of gaining a certain level of control over a MS, concentrates on mobile malware. Wang et al. [WGH09] modeled the potential spreading patterns for malware on mobile devices. Their research on propagation of mobile malware concentrated on Bluetooth technology, as introduced in the first emerging worms for mobile devices, for instance, Cabir, Commwarrior. Propagation was limited in terms of physical proximity to other vulnerable mobile devices. Wang et al. also created a spreading model for malware propagating via multimedia messaging. Their conclusion is that for a major mobile malware outbreak the market would have to be more uniform. Our approach is based on a well-supported standard and is only limited by terms of base station transmission range. The basis in [FLJ<sup>+</sup>07] is mobile messaging and a vulnerability in a VoIP service. Their results point out the limits of self-propagating malware in terms of network capabilities as well as possible counter-measures on the network level to oppose a malware outbreak.

As our approach omits the network provider, monitoring the mobile device is a good option to counter the novel technique. One indicator for an infection is an increased number of processes. Kim et al. [KSS08] took up this concept and presented an approach to detect anomalies in power consumption levels of a mobile device. Their starting position is malicious software that tries to utilize WiFi with its increased energy requirements. Another indicator for a potential infection is taken into consideration in [CWYL07]. By monitoring the usage of text messaging and Bluetooth activity of a mobile device via an agent process, *ibid.* called SmartSiren, malware would immediately be detected when trying to contact or infect other systems. Their assumptions are based on known malware, e.g., Cabir. The developer of openBSC, Harald Welte, started investigating protocol conformance and MS stability by fuzzing the radio interface [Wel09].

The main goal of this paper is to point out yet another security issue with GSM. Others are going towards the same direction with their research. Hulton [HS08], for example, is concentrating on the network security of GSM and recently presented his work on passively intercepting GSM traffic with a SDR. The aim of Hulton's work is to point out the weak encryption scheme utilized in GSM. Nohl et al. [NP09] perform similar efforts to attack

the GSM encryption. By distributedly calculating a rainbow table they provided the means to decrypt recordings of GSM communication.

### 3 Technical Aspects

Certain aspects and flaws of the mobile network technology are essential for our approach. Both concepts, the GSM protocol and the OTA Client Provisioning, and in particular their specific security issues are presented in the subsequent section.

#### 3.1 GSM Fundamentals

A GSM network is built upon numerous subsystems and utilizes various protocols for the different network sections, e.g., the air interface or the wired network. Those have been designed more than 15 years ago and lack certain security features nowadays deemed essential for wireless networks.

The significant security problem in GSM protocol is the lack of mutual authentication between the BTS and the MS. As standardized in [3GP01] the authentication algorithm A3 only covers mobile device authentication towards the base station but not the base station authentication towards the MS. When the specifications were created this problem has not been addressed, as a man-in-the-middle attack was unfeasible due to the lack of the technical equipment required to carry out such an attack. Lawful interception on the other hand was made possible with this design flaw.

Fundamental to being able to exploit this flaw is getting the MS to connect to a private cell. The handset keeps an internal list of available cells and chooses the most suitable one in terms of connection quality according to the two standardized criteria [3GP90]. One criterion is used for cell selection whereas the other criterion is used for cell reselection, which is one being more relevant for our approach. It selects the cell with the best radio connection, taking into consideration the signal strength as well as the duration the cell has been visible on the handset. One crucial factor for the method of selection is the signal strength emitted by the BTS for a single cell.

Yet, before having a MS connect to a private base station another prerequisite must be met. The handset has an internally stored list of preferred networks when connecting to a new cell. This means that it will connect to the best, in terms of signal strength, available cell being part of a preferred network. Identification of the network provider is merely based on an operator identifier that is broadcast on the Broadcast Control Channel (BCCH) of every cell. This identifier is constructed from the Mobile Network Code (MNC) and the Mobile Country Code (MCC). Every country is identified by a three digit MCC whereas the MNC identifies the operator; the MCC for Germany is, for instance, “262”. The allocation of the MNC numbers is administered by a country-specific official institution, for example, the *Bundesnetzagentur* in Germany. For instance T-Mobile Germany was assigned the MNC “01” and is consequently identified by the MNC – MCC combination “262-01”. These

identifiers are publicly accessible on the internet, or they can be exposed by the MS or even intercepted on the air interface. Impersonating a particular network operator requires little effort compared to setting up a working GSM Base Transceiver Station.

In retrospect, broadcasting a regular operator identification code makes one's own openBTS based fraudulent cell appear to be a legitimate base station for GSM handsets, as there is no mechanism for the MS to verify the genuineness of the MCC-MNC combination.

### 3.2 Client Provisioning Mechanism

OMA Client Provisioning is the process by which a Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) client is configured with a minimum of user interaction. OMA Client Provisioning V1.1 [OMA09a] is a backwards compatible extension of the client provisioning functionality included in WAP 2.0. Client provisioning enables a network operator to send new settings over the air. After receiving the settings, depending on the handset's reconfiguration mechanism, either the customer manually confirms the installation of the new device settings or the handset is reconfigured transparently. Subsequently, the subscriber is able to use the new configuration.

The options and structure for OMA Client Provisioning messages are defined in [OMA09c]. Numerous mobile device characteristics are used to configure the different device settings, for example, proxies, Network Access Points (NAPs), vendor specific parameters, options related to applications and client identity parameters. Additional characteristics may also be added.

A directory listing Mobile Equipment (ME) with their respective supported version of the OMA Client Provisioning specifications is not available. Yet, the OMA is comprised of companies working in the GSM sector, for example, Nokia, Ericsson, Microsoft, Orange SA, and was formed in 2002. Devices introduced into the market after this date presumably support the OMA Client Provisioning specifications.

In terms of security the provisioning mechanism incorporates shared-secret authentication of messages. This is achieved by mutual computation of a HMAC value. The HMAC value is calculated by feeding the encoded provisioning content as well as the secret to the hash algorithm, which is the Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) in the case of OMA Client Provisioning. OMA Provisioning Bootstrap supports four different security mechanisms [OMA09b]. All four are based on a shared secret between the MS and the sender of the provisioning message. One of them is referred to as "USERPIN" and requires the recipient to enter a message specific Personal Identification Number (PIN) (not to be confused with the PIN to unlock the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM)) in order to validate the settings. The user must know the PIN that was utilized to sign the OTA message to reproduce the HMAC value. Secret subscriber information, which is the IMSI, represents the shared secret for the HMAC calculation of the "NETWPIN" security option. Checking the authenticity of the message happens transparently without any user interaction. "USER-NETWPIN" represents a combination of the earlier described options. The secret key for the HMAC calculation is compromised of the subscriber's IMSI and PIN. To validate the

settings the subscriber has to enter the PIN so the HMAC value can be reproduced and verified. “USERMACPIN” security relies on an out-of-band delivery of the authentication information (HMAC and PIN) which makes it the least preferred method for OMA Client Provisioning. The particular security type utilized in a provisioning message is specified in the provisioning message header, along with the respective HMAC value.

## 4 Reconfiguring a Handset

First of all, we are going to describe our approach on how to attack MSs. To review and put our attack to test we implemented a proof of concept. During the preparation of the tests a few technical issues with the SDR hardware had to be solved.

### 4.1 Attack scenario clarification

For our approach we combined the shortcomings described in Section 3. Provisioning messages sent by a network operator are usually secured with the “NETWPIN” mechanism, as the required user interaction for these reconfiguration messages is minimal. The network operator has knowledge of the secret IMSI number that is utilized with these security settings. By setting up a private BTS, taking into consideration the limitations concerning cell selection, an attacker is able to gain knowledge of this subscriber identification. At this point, after retrieving the IMSI during the MS’s authentication, the adversary is capable of creating authentic provisioning messages. Figure 1 depicts the three essential steps during an attack.




Figure 1: First of all (1), the handset arrives in transmission range of the private BTS. Afterwards (2), it selects the private cell accordingly to the cell reselection criterion and connects to the same. The third and final step is to send the provisioning message to the handset in order reconfigure it.

The different characteristics available for configuration are covered in [OMA09c]. With these options it is possible to rewrite the homepage of the handset's browser or reconfigure the data network connection in order to route all internet traffic through a private proxy. Depending on the latent shortcomings in the MS's security, an attacker might even install additional software on the device.

To send these configuration updates to the handset in a private GSM cell, an adversary only needs to encode the content according to the GSM specifications and incorporate them in a text message. As the header of this message matches a default text message it can be delivered using the traditional way. Different scenarios relying on the OMA Client Provisioning functionality are viable, depending on the ME capabilities. Some particular attacks are described in [MGP09].

The general driving force behind this attack is gaining control over a MS on a long-term basis. Particularly industrial espionage is one potential scenario. Employees might be equipped with one particular type of MS. An attacker would forge a convenient reconfiguration message and place his private BTS close to the company facilities. With the handsets under the attacker's control retrieving confidential company information is straightforward. Botnets will also focus on mobile devices for different reasons, e.g., mobility, lack of security, number of potential victims. By reconfiguring mobile devices with our approach a network operator cannot take actions to prevent this kind of attack.

## 4.2 Practical Realization

The principal component for the realization of the test implementation is a freely programmable and adaptable hardware device. Tampering with the different layers of the GSM protocol is one of the requirements that have to be met when performing research in this area. Acquiring professional equipment for running a GSM network would not allow unhindered research. The Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) from Ettus Research LLC met the requirements. It is just the plain motherboard for signal processing, so we also had to commission the appropriate transceiver boards plus antennas. As this motherboard is general purpose hardware many different types of daughterboards are available. Each of these is equipped for a particular frequency range and transmission requirements. The full equipment for the tests consists of a rev4 USRP, two RFX1800 transceiver-daughterboards, each combined with a VERT900 antenna.

A SDR, the USRP in particular, provides a hardware interface by which it can be accessed via the software that performs all the signal processing. GNU radio is a software component specifically developed for the USRP and takes care of the signal processing and interfacing to the SDR. With this software package a developer is not confronted with all the different aspects of signal processing while being in control of the actual data.

The final component for running our own GSM network is the logics behind the signal processing. This important aspect is handled by openBTS, a project that provides the essential GSM functionality and requires GNU Radio to interface the USRP. Another similar project is openBSC, which utilizes legacy hardware. Yet, the community behind

openBTS is more active and it is based on the GNU radio project which offers adaptability for future research in combination with the USRP.

Running a radio network in our test lab environment in Germany requires an official permit by the *Bundesnetzagentur*. To comply with these regulations we applied for a test license for our system and received an allowance for that particular location and for the Absolute Radio Frequency Channel Number (ARFCN) 866. This allotted channel corresponds to an uplink frequency of 1781 megahertz (MHz) and a downlink frequency of 1876 MHz.

The software had to be configured to the allotted ARFCN 866 as openBTS is by default tuned to the 900 MHz frequency band and required minor changes to be able to transmit with 1800 MHz.

### 4.3 Challenges during Realization

One major issue in implementing a working GSM network based on openBTS was an infirmity with the internal clock of the USRP. The GSM standard demands an accuracy of 0.05 parts per million (ppm) for this particular part, whereas the clock on the USRP drifts with about 20 ppm. The consequence was that our test handsets (HTC Snap) were not able to correctly identify the BCCH, not to mention successfully establishing a connection to the BTS.

The solution to this problem was to find an external clock with a proper accuracy, disable the onboard clock and feed the external signal to the USRP. An assembly kit “FA-SY 1” by the German magazine for amateur radio and radio technology *funkamateure* could provide the required 64 MHz while maintaining an acceptable drift. Audits of the output frequency as to adjust the onboard heating module allowed for an accuracy of about 8 ppm before the clock was fit into the casing of the USRP. This variance between the tests of the USRP showed enough stability for our test handsets to successfully connect and allowed us to place a test call between the phones.

### 4.4 Lab Testing

Sending a provisioning message is not a feature of openBTS and had to be added to its functionality. The implemented functions take the XML configuration and calculate the HMAC value over that data using the “NETWPIN” security mechanism. As soon as a MS connects to the openBTS base station the previously mentioned functions assemble the message as well as the corresponding HMAC value and send it to the target device.

For testing the reconfiguration mechanism of our proof of concept we could utilize two HTC Snap handsets with Windows Mobile 6.1 Standard installed. The installation of the settings on the particular test devices happened transparently. Solely after the reconfiguration an information message would acquaint the user with the following message: “Your device settings were changed successfully”.



## 5 Field Experiment

To evaluate the practicality of our proof of concept we conducted a field experiment in conjunction with a survey to assess mobile security awareness of subscribers. Prior to the experiment we estimated the probability of a successful attack depending on the technical knowledge and security awareness of the subscriber. Also the attack might be subject to certain constraints and limitations that can only be experienced during real world conditions.

### 5.1 Scenario Clarification

For the field experiment with the USRP a suitable location had to be found. Retaining the transmission power of the SDR and taking into consideration the cell reselection criterion narrows down the potential locations to test our approach. Good locations either provide poor reception or are subject to continuous changes of the available cells. Setting up a private BTS at such a location facilitates the attack as handsets will more likely connect to it because of better signal strength and period of visibility of the cell (cell reselection criterion).

A EuroCity train constitutes a good playground as it traverses multiple cells during a journey and it also provides power to run the hardware. Yet, many currently deployed carriages are equipped with GSM repeaters that act as a radio interface link between the outside provider BTSs and the inside of the carriages in order improve the service quality therein. Because of that, we had to reason out disruptive aspects for the test prior to commencing the actual field experiment. Running the base station was technically possible and the test phones connected to our GSM cell.

For the field experiment auditability and verification of the results were essential aspects. To comply with these requirements the homepage of the phones' browsers were reconfigured via a OTA Client Provisioning message. Assessment of the successful reconfiguration happened as part of a questionnaire, which provided additional data to estimate the success rate of our approach.

### 5.2 Experiment Results

During the tests different network identifications were configured in the BTS. Prior to commencing the actual experiment the functionality of the systems was validated with the test devices and a test network identification (MCC=001, MNC=01). This identification should not be found in the real world as it is solely used for test equipment. For the actual experiment we planned to utilize German telecom provider identifiers to imitate legitimate base stations.

Surprisingly, during testing the openBTS functionality numerous mobile devices con-

nected to our GSM cell within minutes. The IMSI latter gave indication about their particular home network provider, as the network provider identifier is part of this number. The connected MSs came from different network providers and favored the test network to their home provider. Running the BTS with the three major German network provider identifications (T-Mobile, Vodafone, e-plus) for the same time period resulted in disproportionately less handsets establishing a connection to the base station. For that reason part of the field experiment was carried out with only relying on the test network identification.

In conformity with the lab tests, the OTA configuration updates were sent to the MSs on establishing a connection to our private BTS. Auditing the performance of the reconfiguration was carried out as part of the questionnaire. This data should be combined with the subscribers' answers provided in the survey in order to calculate the likelihood of a successful attack as a function of subscriber security awareness.

We expected the overall rate of success to be moderate. Furthermore, we estimated that with increasing familiarity with IT security the chance of a successful attack would decline. Overall 59 people directly affected by the experiments agreed to give feedback. The assessment of the survey showed that all mobile devices encountered during the experiment required the user to manually decide whether to install our update to the mobile device or to discard the provisioning message. One part of the involved persons stated to have deleted the message because of undesirability. The other part of the victims clicked the message away in a fright.

### **5.3 Capabilities and Limitations during the Test**

The timespan between activation of the base station and the first handset to connect was less than a minute. This period would vary depending on different factors, e.g., the signal strength of operator cells.

The coverage of our private cell was limited to the one carriage where the BTS was running in. During the field experiment devices within this area would connect to our GSM cell.

The OTA messages were handled differently by the various handsets. Generally, Sony Ericsson and Nokia phones require the user to permit the installation of the messages. During the survey it became clear, that confronted with such a message a subscriber would certainly reject the reconfiguration message.

## **6 Conclusions**

The number of GSM subscriptions is still going to rise until 2014 [Fro09] when successive technologies are going to supersede GSM. During this time SDR equipment as well as the respective software is going to become more elaborate. Because of this and as long as security is not improved, attacks on the network are going to become more presumable.

The approach we presented in this paper provides another way of attacking a MS in a

GSM network. Limitations of our strategy are imposed by the transmission range and signal strength. In fact, the field experiment showed the lack of security awareness amongst mobile phone users, whereas the question of the applicability of reconfiguring MSs was negated. The field experiment pointed out this fact as the attack was not successful considering the number of reconfigured devices. This also leads to the conclusion that the work presented by Mune et al. [MGP09], who can only utilize the “USERPIN” security option for the HMAC calculation, can not be applied in practice. Future work will concentrate on recent technologies in order to develop means to prevent DoS attacks on MSs and provide protection for the subscriber.

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## Acronyms

<b>ARFCN</b>	Absolute Radio Frequency Channel Number	<b>MHz</b>	megahertz
<b>BCCH</b>	Broadcast Control Channel	<b>MNC</b>	Mobile network Code
<b>BTS</b>	Base Transceiver Station	<b>MS</b>	Mobile Station
<b>CDMA</b>	Code Division Multiple Access	<b>NAP</b>	Network Access Point
<b>DoS</b>	Denial of Service	<b>OMA</b>	Open Mobile Alliance
<b>GSM</b>	Global System for Mobile Communications	<b>OTA</b>	over the air
<b>HLR</b>	Home Location Register	<b>PIN</b>	Personal Identification Number
<b>HMAC</b>	Hash-based Message Authentication Code	<b>ppm</b>	parts per millions
<b>HSPA</b>	High Speed Packet Access	<b>SDR</b>	Software Defined Radio
<b>IMSI</b>	International Mobile Subscriber Identity	<b>SHA-1</b>	Secure Hash Algorithm 1
<b>MCC</b>	Mobile Country Code	<b>SIM</b>	Subscriber Identity Module
<b>ME</b>	Mobile Equipment	<b>USRP</b>	Universal Software Radio Peripheral
		<b>WAP</b>	Wireless Application Protocol